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Abstract 
Purpose: We investigate the potential influence of corporate governance mechanisms on risk 
disclosure quality in Tunisia. 
 
Methodology: We examine 152 annual reports of Tunisian non-financial-listed firms during 
2008-2013.We use the manual content analysis method to measure the risk disclosure quality.  
 
Findings: We find that the quality of risk disclosure in Tunisian companies is relatively low. 
We also find that the quality of risk disclosure is positively associated with institutional 
ownership, board independence, the presence of women on the board, the presence of family 
members on the board, and the independence of audit committee. Managerial ownership has a 
negative effect on risk disclosure quality. Finally, we find that the revolution decreases the 
influence of concentration ownership, government ownership, family ownership and audit 
committee size on risk disclosure quality.  
 
Originality/value:  
Using a comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms and a new measure for risk 
disclosure quality in Tunisia, we provide the first empirical evidence on the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on risk disclosure quality in a developing country. Our study has 
theoretical and practical implications for both developed and developing countries.  
 
 




















Transparency has attracted increased attention following the major scandals and corporate 
collapses of the early 2000s and the global financial crisis. These collapses emphasized the need 
for information and good corporate governance. Besides, there is an increasing demand for high 
quality information for investors’ decision-making process (Miihkinen, 2013). Tunisia was not 
immune from these events and gives more importance to transparency and good corporate 
governance practices.  
 
Accounting literature emphasized the importance of the risk disclosure to fulfil the demand of 
their stakeholders to assess the company’s risk profile and the firm market value (e.g. Abraham 
et al., 2012; Miihkinen, 2013). Risk disclosure may be affected by governance structures 
(Abraham and Cox, 2007). Hence, there is a need for research to examine the influence of 
corporate governance mechanisms on risk disclosure (Said Mokhtar and Mellett, 2013). 
Although extensive literature has examined the impact of governance on disclosure, little has 
examined the impact of governance on risk disclosure in general and in developing countries in 
particular.   
 
In addition, there is a need for more risk disclosure especially during the crisis or the challenges 
that a company may undergo, in order to assess its future performance and to ensure the 
protection of their wealth. Therefore, understanding the determinants of risk disclosure 
represents relevant information for standard-setters. Besides, there were calls for further 
research on the impact of corporate governance on risk disclosure (Khlif and Hussainey, 2016). 
Our paper replied to this call for research. It worth noting that prior research uses the quantity 
of disclosure as a proxy for disclosure quality. However, literature shows that disclosure quality 
is more important than disclosure quantity (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2004). This motivates us to measure risk disclosure quality and then to examine the impact of 
governance mechanisms on this type of disclosure.  
 
Tunisia provides a unique country context to analyze the impact of governance on risk 
disclosure quality. It was influenced by the financial scandals around the world as well as the 
“Arab Spring” that was sparked at the beginning of 2011. This public demonstration against the 
country’s political system has doubtless severely affected also the economic development and 
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consequently Tunisian firms. We consider that it is crucial, in such context, to reassure investors 
about the risk that may incur. Hence, risk disclosure becomes increasingly useful to keep 
corporate survival and ensure especially investors about their wealth; these risks related 
information should be of high quality to help investors in their decision-making process. 
 
In addition, it is necessary to implement good governance mechanisms, responding to a 
democratic regime, characterized by accountability and clearly defined responsibilities, and to 
ensure satisfactory transparency and restore confidence towards investors. That is why new 
debates took place in Tunisia after the revolution in order to reinforce this corporate governance 
structure and to assure better transparency. The mentioned scenario of events and debate on risk 
disclosure motivates us to undertake this study. Indeed, the purpose of this study is to 
investigate the practices of risk disclosure in Tunisia and the impact of the corporate governance 
structure on risk disclosure quality. In addition, we test whether the revolution has an impact 
on this relationship. 
Our study has several contributions. We examine risk disclosure quality in an emerging market, 
where investor confidence was considerably damaged by the revolution of 2011. Therefore, we 
introduced a new measure of risk disclosure quality on Tunisian annual reports. We also 
contribute by examining the impact of governance mechanisms Tunisian companies’ risk 
disclosure quality in their annual reports. We also consider examining the impact of a period of 
political crisis on the disclosure-governance relation.  
The empirical findings revealed that the risk disclosure quality is positively and significantly 
associated with institutional, independence of the directors, the presence of women on the 
board, the presence of family members on the board and the independence of audit committee. 
However, managerial ownership has a negative effect on risk disclosure quality. In addition, 
the results show that the revolution has a negative impact on the association between risk 
disclosure quality and government ownership, family ownership. Moreover, the revolution 
decreases also the influence of concentration ownership, government ownership, family 
ownership and audit committee size on the quality of risk disclosure. However, no change in 
the relationship between the quality of risk disclosure and the remainder corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the corporate governance 
and risk disclosure in Tunisia. Section 3 reviews the literature and develops hypotheses. Section 
4 discusses the methodology. Empirical analysis and the discussion are presented in Sections 5 
and 6. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Corporate Governance and Risk disclosure in Tunisia 
2.1. Corporate governance 
Tunisia has been affected by the financial scandals like Enron (2001), Vivendi (2002), Parmalat 
(2003), and the 2008 crisis but especially by the collapse experienced by Batam (leader in mass 
distribution particularly in appliances) at the end of 2002. This bankruptcy was the result of 
considerable financial commitments of the company, without any warning from its auditor. The 
confidence crisis exploded with the case of BATAM gave birth to the Law No. 2005-96[1] 
related to the security of financial relations. This law highlighted two fundamental aspects: 
strengthening corporate governance rules and the improvement of the quality of external 
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auditor. The discussions on the concept of corporate governance in Tunisia started in the late 
90s. In 2004, the debates officially took place through two institutions worrying about studying 
the governance characteristics, in Tunisia and overseas, in order to identify the areas needing 
improvement and specific recommendations to the Tunisian context. Hence, the Arab Institute 
of Business Managers (IACE) held in October 2004 a conference about “Corporate Governance 
in Tunisia: Responsibility and Ethics”. Then a Conference on Governance and Development 
took place at the end of 2005 discussing the topic “Towards Better Governance for 
Development in the Maghreb”. In 2006, the French Institute of Directors (IFA) held another 
international conference held in Tunisia to investigate “Governance, Performance and Value 
Creation: Challenges of the Tunisian company”. Therefore, after several investigations, the first 
Tunisian code of good corporate governance practices has been developed by the Tunisian 
Center of corporate governance (CTGE)[2]. This document was produced with the support of 
the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) and in collaboration with the OECD and 
IFC (International Finance Corporation). 
However, the revolution of 14 January 2011 has raised a problem of good governance and 
several shortcomings in Tunisian companies. Therefore, new debates have been created to 
strengthen the governance practices already established in the 2008 code and to ensure 
transparency and regain investor confidence. Indeed, the political authorities became better 
aware of the importance of the implementation of good governance system in Tunisia; this 
system should promote transparency, integrity and the fight against corruption. The 2009' guide 
was updated in collaboration with the CIPE and with the support of the OECD and the IFC. 
This update takes into account, besides the family companies, the governance of Limited 
Liability Companies (SARL). It aims to make an available practical guide to Tunisian 
companies to help them to strengthen their knowledge regarding corporate governance and to 
assist them in setting up a reliable governance system that preserves all stakeholders' interest. 
This code has focused on the structure and responsibilities of the board, the need for an internal 
audit, the transparency and the role of auditors, the managers’ privileges, the stakeholders’ 
relationship, the practices of good governance in family companies, the managers’ role, the 
ethics and the governance of SARL. 
2.2. Risk disclosure 
The meaning of risk has been evolving through times. In pre-modern society, the risk was 
related to the act of nature and perceived as uncontrollable. However, following the industrial 
revolution and the invention of probabilities and mathematical methodology, the perception of 
risk has changed. In an introduction to factor analysis of risk information, Jones (2006; p. 8) 
has defined risk as “The probable frequency and probable magnitude of future loss”. This 
definition includes three concepts; the probability of risk, the frequency and magnitude of risk 
and the universality of risk[3]. The following definition is applicable regardless of the nature 
and the context of risk.   
Then the risk, referring to the modernist view, in contrast with the pre-modern era, includes 
both the positive and negative outcomes of events (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). That is why it 
can be defined as “any opportunity or prospect, or of any hazard, danger, harm, threat or 
exposure, that has already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the company in the 
future or of the management of any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, or threat or 
exposure” (Linsley and Shrives, 2006 ; p. 402). In other words, the risk is when we take a 
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chance at something that either can turn out better for us or could result in a negative outcome. 
Therefore, risk can be a “downside risk”[4] or a “volatility risk” [5]. 
In addition, the concept of risk was related to business strategies, objectives, and economic 
performance. As such, risk is referred to as follows: “uncertain future events which could 
influence the achievement of the organization’s strategic, operational and financial objectives. 
The dimensions of risk also include the impact on an organization’s reputation, even “loss of 
legitimacy” from activities deemed unacceptable to the community” (IFAC 1999; p. 6). In the 
same view, King II has defined risk as “uncertain future events that could influence the 
achievement of a company’s objectives” (King Committee, 2002, p. 30).  
Consequently, different definitions have emerged in the literature. The most popular definition 
is that mentioned in FRS 5 (p. 9)[6] that defines risk as “uncertainty as the amount of benefit. 
The term includes both potential for gain and exposure to loss”. This definition was also 
suggested by professional reports like ICAEW (1997), CICA (2002) and IASB (2005). This 
definition of risk will be further incorporated into the risk disclosure the definition followed in 
our study. 
After defining risk we can relate risk disclosure to the dissemination of any information that 
can make the reader able to know about “any opportunity or prospect, or of any hazard, danger, 
harm, threat or exposure, that has already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the 
company in the future or of the management of any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, 
threat or exposure” (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; p. 389). Also, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004, p. 
269) defined risk disclosures as “a communication of information concerning firms’ strategies, 
characteristics, operations, and other external factors that have the potential to affect expected 
results”. 
 
2.3. The state of disclosure on Tunisian annual reports  
The regulatory bodies in Tunisia began to introduce reforms regarding disclosure from the 
ninety years and gave it more attention in recent years. Therefore, the process of disclosure by 
listed Tunisian firms is framed through: 
 The accounting system of Tunisian companies 
In December 1996, Tunisia has managed to adopt standards in harmony with those of the IASB 
and this by the promulgation of the Law No. 96-112 of 30 December 1996 concerning 
companies accounting system. The Tunisian accounting reform through the accounting system 
has the main objective to improve the usefulness of financial reporting in the stock market 
(Belgacem and Omri, 2014). This system fills deficiencies of the PCG (1968) and aims to 
integrate into the world economy and improve the quality of financial information disclosed by 
the Tunisian companies. It requires Tunisian companies to comply with its standards and the 
periodic disclosure of financial statements but also gives them the opportunity to broadcast 
other information that contributes to the enrichment of these financial statements. Indeed, 
paragraph 83 of Decree No. 96-2459 of 30 December 1996 approving the conceptual 
framework of accounting gives importance to non-financial information such as social, 
environmental, and technological. However, we note that compared to the financial statements 
which benefit of a rich legal framework, there are no comparable standards covering the content 
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and the additional information that can be disclosed in the annual report (Chakroun and 
Matoussi, 2010).  
 The 94-117 law concerning the reorganization of the financial market 
Following the Law of 14 November 1994, new specialized and independent structures have 
been established in the Tunisian financial market. These structures are the Stock Exchange of 
Tunis (BVMT), the Financial Market Council (CMF)[7], Interprofessional Company of 
Compensation and Securities Deposit (STICODEVAM) and the Market Guarantee Fund 
(FGM). In addition, this law aimed to strengthen the rules of transparency and security and 
improve information for the investors and the protection of savings. However aiming to a 
greater economic openness to the global markets and the need for new foreign investors, some 
reforms have been made by the Law 205-96 of 18 October 2005 mainly aim to strengthen the 
financial security and the credibility of the information provided by companies. In addition, this 
law mentioned the content of the annual report. Indeed, Article 3 (new)[8] states that the “annual 
report on the company's management should include the information laid down by the Financial 
Market Council and particularly, a presentation of activities’ results, their expected 
development and eventually the changes in the methods of the development and the 
presentation of financial statements, as well as elements of internal control”.  
We also note that this article merely mentions the content of the annual report, unlike the 
financial statements, as an indicative and not compulsory basis. In fact, the Tunisian listed firms   
have only the obligation to file their financial statements[9] that must be prepared in accordance 
with rules and standards of the Tunisian accounting system. Then these statements should also 
be given to the BVMT and CMF[10]. 
 The Commercial Companies Code (CSC) 
According to article 201 of CSC, we find that the Board of Directors has to prepare an annual 
report and submit it to the General Assembly. However, this article fails to specify the content 
of this report. In other words, the legal obligations relating to the annual report are reduced to 
submission of a “detailed” annual report and it remains fully at the discretion of managers to 
determine the content of this report (Yaich, 2004). 
 The settlement of Financial Market Council regarding the public offering 
The main missions of the Financial Market Council (CMF) are the regulation of the financial 
market, the control of financial information, the financial market supervision, the sanctions 
imposed for violations to regulations and the national and international cooperation and 
communication with its environment. Among the regulations regarding Tunisian companies 
making public offerings, there are the Article 3 (new) of Law No. 2005-96 of 18 October 2005 
and the Article 44 (new) of the Decree of the Minister of Finance September 17, 2008. They 
provide mainly a presentation on the results of activities, their foreseeable evolution and 
changes in methods of preparation and presentation of financial statements (Diouani and Khlifi, 
2013). However, it should be noted that Article 44 CMF took the initiative to frame the 
disclosure of information in the annual reports by presenting in an annex a standard 
management report model containing all the required information provided within defined 
 7 
 
sections and allowed some discretion to the company to include in its annual report other 
information in addition to those mentioned. Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out that despite 
the importance accorded by CMF to clarify disclosures in the annual report, no sanctions in this 
settlement has been taken into account in case of non-compliance with this disclosure. It just 
publishes releases to remind companies of the publication of this report[11]. This gives a 
voluntary and not mandatory scope to such information. This weakness in the sanctions process 
could explain the limited disclosure by the Tunisian listed companies (Chakroun, 2013). 
Despite the requirements of the CSC, the corporate accounting system and the Regulation of 
the Financial Market Council; the disclosure of Tunisian companies in annual reports remains 
poorly regulated and remains a free decision to managers to choose the information they want 
to disseminate in their report. It is also the case of risk disclosure in Tunisia, which is considered 
a voluntary disclosure and remains to the discretion of managers who, according to benefits and 
costs of risk-related information, will choose to disclose it (or not). 
3. Literature Review and hypotheses development 
Accounting literature has highlighted the importance of the dissemination of risk-related 
information and the need to improve it. Researchers have investigated the practices of risk 
disclosure (e.g. Dobler, 2008; Marzouk, 2016). In addition, Deumes (2008) believed that prior 
research suffers from some limitations especially being focused on the content of risk disclosure 
rather than its quality. For that, he called future research to examine the risk disclosure taking 
into account both the quantity and quality dimensions.  
 
Regarding the multi-country studies on corporate risk disclosure, the research of Dobler et al. 
(2011) is considered as the first cross-country study on the corporate risk disclosure. 
Researchers examined the determinants of risk disclosure in developed countries (e.g. Lajili, 
2009; Elshandidy and Neri, 2015) however the research on the determinants of risk information 
in developing countries is limited. Researchers examined determinants of risk disclosure in 
Pakistan (Abid and Shaik, 2015), Malaysia (Amran et al., 2008), India (Saggar and Singh, 
2017),Kuwait (Al-Shammari, 2014), Saudi Arabia (e.g. Al-Maghsom et al., 2017 and Alzead 
and Hussainey, 2017), Bahrain (Mousa and Elamir, 2013), UAE (Hassan, 2009), Egypt 
(Mokhtar and Mellet, 2013; Baroma, 2014; Marzouk, 2016; Khalil and Maghraby, 2017), 
Finland (Martikainen et al., 2015), MENA emerging countries (Moumen et al., 2015, 2016), 
Malawi (Tauringana and Chithambo, 2016), Qatar (Elgammal et al., 2018), China (Elshandidy 
et al., 2018). Few of these studies had paid attention to the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on corporate risk disclosure. Our paper aims to fill this gap. We measured the 
quality of risk disclosure for Tunisian non-financial listed companies and investigated the 
influence of corporate governance mechanisms on the quality of risk disclosure. We focused 
on ownership structure (concentration ownership, family ownership, foreign investors, 
managerial ownership, Institutional ownership, Government ownership); the characteristics of 
the board of directors (independence of the board, CEO Duality, board size, the presence of 
women on the board, board meeting frequency); the characteristics of the audit committee 
(expertise of the committee members of audit, the audit committee meeting frequency, audit 




Ownership structure  
 
We have set a number of research hypotheses. The first one is related to the ownership structure. 
We aim to test the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: The ownership structure affects the risk disclosure quality. 
 
To test this hypothesis, we have developed sub-hypotheses to examine the impact of different 
ownership types on risk disclosure. Literature shows that concentrated ownership may enhance 
the disclosure of relevant information to stakeholders and avoid the discretionary behaviour of 
the managers (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Companies heavily concentrated in capital induce a 
significant shareholder control on managers (e.g. Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990; Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996). In contrast, companies that have a low concentration capital leaves a 
considerable margin of maneuvering leaders (Becht, 1997). According to Oliveira et al. (2011), 
the concentrated ownership structure decreases the agency costs. Indeed owners internalize the 
benefits of monitoring management, which allow a lower opportunistic behaviour by 
management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Mohobbot (2005) argued that in companies 
characterized by concentration ownership, managers may disseminate any information about 
the risk through informal ways such as at meetings, hence it will be a low risk disclosure to 
stakeholders. Literature also showed that concentration ownership could affect the financial 
reporting quality (e.g. Bradbury et al., 2006 and Firth et al., 2007). For instance, Firth et al. 
(2007) showed that the presence of blockholders entails poor quality of financial information. 
In addition, Miihkinen (2012) showed that concentrated ownership might adversely affect the 
disclosure of high-quality risk information. Some empirical studies found a negative association 
between ownership concentration and risk disclosure (Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Said 
Mokhtar and Mellett, 2013). However, Konishi and Mohobbot (2007) did not found an 
association between the ownership distribution pattern and risk disclosure. Because of the 
mixed findings, we hypothesis that:  
H1.1: Concentrated ownership negatively affects the risk disclosure quality.    
According to the signaling theory, the firms use the disclosure as a signaling tool to the 
institutional investors in order to meet their information needs. Institutional investors are 
considered as the most sensitive investors to financial communication and they play a major 
monitoring role that enhances financial reporting quality and firm performance. Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) showed that a higher proportion of 
institutional investors tend to reduce information asymmetry and consequently improve the 
disclosure of private information. Moreover, Healy et al. (1999) indicated that the companies 
widely disseminating their information attract institutional investors. Literature examines the 
impact of institutional ownership on disclosure, and offers mixed findings. Studies show a 
negative impact (Schadewitz and Blevins, 1998), while studies show a positive impact include 
(e.g. Mangena and Pike, 2005; Barako et al., 2006). Eng and Mak (2003) did not find any 
impact in their research. Bushee and Noe (2000) found a positive impact of short-term 
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institutional share ownership on disclosure, but no impact for long-term institutional share 
ownership. Risk disclosure literature shows mixed findings. For example, Abraham and Cox 
(2007) find a negative impact, Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) did not find an impact. Solomon 
(1999) found that large institutional investors are susceptible to require more information on 
potentially relevant risk that management may retain for strategic purposes. Therefore, we 
hypothesis that:   
H1.2: Institutional ownership positively affects the risk disclosure quality. 
 
Based on agency theory, the information asymmetry can be reduced when managers have a 
proportion of equity in the company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is argued by the 
alignment of the interests of shareholders and managers (Leung and Horwitz, 2004). Literature 
examined the impact of managerial ownership on disclosure offers mixed findings. A positive 
impact was found in Warfield et al. (1995), Nagar et al. (2003), Mohd-Nasir and Abdulah 
(2004), and Leung and Horwitz (2004), while a negative impact is found in Ruland et al. (1990), 
Eng and Mak (2003) and Sepasi et al. (2016). Huafang and Jianguo (2007), however, did not 
find any significant impact.  
 
Looking at risk disclosure literature, Deumes and Knechel (2008) found that the extent of 
voluntary reporting on risk management and internal control and managerial ownership is 
negatively correlated. We, therefore, hypothesize that: 
 
H1.3: Managerial ownership negatively affects the risk disclosure quality. 
According to the agency theory, agency conflicts can arise between the government and the 
managers because of their divergence of interest. Indeed the aim of the government differs from 
that of managers in the sense that it is interested in the survival and the interests of the nation 
more than profit (Mak and Li, 2001). Thereby, corporate disclosure can be a remedy for these 
agency problems and fight against the opportunistic behaviour of leaders. In addition, according 
to the stakeholder theory, the powerful stakeholders may exert pressure on managers and force 
them to disseminate better information.  Eng and Mak (2003), Makhija and Patton (2004), 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Huafang and Jianguo (2007) and MohdGhazali (2007) found a 
positive impact of state ownership on disclosure, while Xiao et al. (2004) find a negative 
impact.  Risk disclosure literature showed a positive impact (Barakat and Hussainey, 2013). 
We, therefore, hypothesize: 
H1.4: Government ownership positively affects the risk disclosure quality. 
Charreaux (1985) argues that conflicts of interests and the agency costs between shareholders 
and managers are almost non-existent in family businesses. This is because owners are often, 
at the same time, the leaders. Thus, the need for control becomes negligible (Fama and Jensen, 
1985). Therefore, the managers (stewards) are viewed as collectively oriented beings primarily 
concerned with acting in the best interest of the organization and by doing so, in the best interest 
of the principal (Davis et. al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). However, although agency 
problems related to the separation of ownership and management may be less severe in family 
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firms, the agency problems related to conflict of interest among owners are all the more present 
(Mohobbot et al., 2007). This is due to the fact that family members who are both member of 
the board of directors and significant shareholders of the company will have direct access to 
various information and therefore have less need to disclose information they hold. 
Accordingly, the need for risk disclosure is reduced too. 
Chau and Gray (2002) argue that the influence of family ownership on voluntary disclosure 
differs at different levels of family ownership due to the convergence of interest and 
management entrenchment effects. They found a positive effect of family ownership on 
disclosure. They explained that family-controlled firms have little motivation to disclose 
information because the demand for public disclosure is relatively weak in comparison with 
firms that have a wider shareholding. They also found that “insider” or family ownership is 
negatively associated with voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Chen and Jaggi (2000) reported that board independence is positively related to financial 
disclosures and this relationship becomes weaker for family-controlled firms. Gelb (2000) and 
Ho and Wong (2001) found family ownership negatively affects disclosure quality. We, 
therefore, hypothesise that:  
H1.5: Family ownership negatively affects the risk disclosure quality. 
Board Characteristics  
 
The second set of hypotheses is related to board structure.  We aim to test the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H2: The board of directors affects the risk disclosure quality. 
To test this hypothesis, we have developed sub-hypotheses to examine the impact of different 
characteristics of the board of directors on the quality of risk disclosure.  
The main role of the board of directors is to evaluate the performance of the managers and avoid 
conflicts of interest. However, achieving this goal requires the independence of the governing 
body regarding the management of the company. This independence is assessed through the 
presence of non-executive or outside directors on the board. When referring to the Tunisian 
Code of good governance, we do not find a precise definition of an independent director. 
Therefore, we can advance the definition of independent directors through literature. Several 
authors such as Higgs (2003) and Beekes and Brown (2006) defined the independent non-
executive directors as the administrators who should not find themselves in a situation that may 
affect their independence of judgment or place them in a situation of actual or potential conflict 
of interest, so they should be independent of management.  
In addition, others have defined external administrators by excluding the internal ones. Thus, 
given that inside directors are those who hold a management position in the firm and which can 
then be of company executives or employees (Sridharan, 1996), so the outside directors are the 
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other directors. Literature showed that independent directors may promote the corporate 
disclosure and may, in turn, gain a good reputation as expert monitors (Samaha et al., 2015). 
Moreover, their presence reduces the likelihood of financial statement fraud (Beasley, 1996). 
In addition, inside directors are less effective than outside directors and are unable to punish 
leaders for fear of losing the personal benefits that they can profit (Jensen, 1993). Indeed, 
independent directors could reduce the information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders by providing more voluntary disclosure (Beasley, 1996). Thus, the appointment of 
independent directors provide better monitoring of management’s behaviour, and so is 
considered as a way to control agency problems (Allini et al., 2016). Besides, from a resource 
dependence theory, the non-executive directors are considered as a link between the company 
and the external environs due to their expertise, prestige and different contacts (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002). 
Prior studies on board independence effects on disclosure were inconclusive. Some studies 
found no impact (Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), while others found a negative 
impact (Eng and Mak, 2003). A number of studies found a positive impact (e.g. Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). Risk disclosure literature found a positive impact 
(e.g. Lajili (2009), Elshandidy and Neri, 2015). Abraham and Cox (2007), Allini et al. (2016), 
Al-Maghzom et al. (2016), however, found no impact. We, therefore, hypothesis that: 
H2.1: Board independence positively affects the risk disclosure quality.  
 
The duality occurs when the chief executive officer (CEO) holds the chair position at the same 
time.  In Tunisia, the separation of the two functions is not an obligation but remains to the 
discretion of the company. This is mentioned throughout the article 215 of the C.S.C[12] “the 
statuses of the company may opt for the dissociation between functions of the board directors’ 
chairman and the manager of the company”. However, these roles are clearly different in their 
nature and contributions; we note also that governance codes generally recommend that they 
have to be realized by different individuals (e.g. Cadbury Report, 1992). In addition, the 
Tunisian Corporate Governance Guide requires separating the two functions in order to be 
efficient. CEO duality contributes to a concentration of decision-making that may harm to the 
board’s governance role regarding disclosure policies (Li et al., 2008) and can affect negatively 
the quality of disclosure and their relevance (e.g. Byard et al., 2006; Firth et al., 2007). The 
entrenchment theory suggests that a combined leadership structure may promote CEO 
entrenchment and conflict of interests. Consequently, the CEO duality may reduce the 
monitoring role and compromises the board independence that may be less motivated to better 
transparency (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Samaha et al., 2015). This is explained by the fact 
that the CEO has access to private information and he/she is less motivated to share such 
information with different shareholders or the other members of the board. Hence, the CEO 
tends to have an opportunistic behaviour and restrict corporate voluntary disclosure (Kim et al., 
2007). 
 
Literature on the impact of CEO duality on disclosure offered mixed findings. A number of 
studies showed no impact (e.g. Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 
 12 
 
2010), while others showed a negative impact (e.g. Allegrini and Greco, 2013, Samaha et al., 
2015). Haniffa and Cooke (2002), however, found a positive impact of CEO duality on 
disclosure. Risk disclosure literature did not find an effect of CEO duality on disclosure 
(Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012 and Mokhtar and Mellett, 2013). Mokhtar and Mellett (2013), 
however, found a negative impact on mandatory risk disclosure only. Based on the agency 
entrenchment theories, we set the following hypothesis:   
H2.2: CEO duality negatively affects the risk disclosure quality. 
In Tunisia, under Article 189 of C.S.C, the board of directors of the public limited companies 
shall consist of at least three members and at most twelve members. In addition, the Tunisian 
Corporate Governance Guide recommends a Board of 7 to 9 members. It advocates “a relatively 
small board to take advantage of different existing expertise and to avoid sinking in endless 
discussions and approaches, and to be more effective and more responsive in decision making”.  
Literature showed that large board size increases the efficiency of the board and promotes the 
disclosure of information (e.g. Cormier et al., 2010). According to the agency theory, the larger 
boards incorporate a variety of expertise and available resources, which results in more 
effectiveness in boards’ monitoring role (Singh et al., 2004; Hidalgo et al., 2011). In fact, these 
boards are less likely to be dominated by management thanks to the diverse members’ opinions 
and the power that may exert to supervise managers, which may in turn promote the corporate 
disclosure (Samaha et al., 2015). In addition, John and Senbet (1998) argued that a large board 
size may improve the monitoring role due to greater availability and combined effort. Indeed, 
a large size of the board will allow a high number of members who have financial and 
accounting background, which could affect managers’ voluntary disclosure decisions and 
extend corporate risk disclosure level (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). This is in line with the 
resource dependency theory, which presumes that large board has a better knowledge and 
ability to ensure the management of corporate resources (Pfeffer, 1972). However, Elzahar and 
Hussainey (2012) and Allini et al. (2016) found no impact of board size on risk disclosure, 
other risk disclosure studies found a positive impact (Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Elshandidy 
and Neri, 2015) while Al-Maghzom et al. (2016) found a negative impact.  Based on agency 
and resource dependency theories. We hypothesize that:   
H2.3: Board size positively affects the risk disclosure quality. 
Literature showed that the diversity of experience, background, and attitude allow providing 
benefits, particularly in corporate governance (Hillman et al., 2007; Srinidhi et al., 2011).  
Female directors can improve decision making by providing different perspectives and opinions 
in the decision-making process. Indeed, gender diversity in the board is an effective driver of 
business performance and can lead to an enrichment of knowledge (Erhardt et al., 2003). 
Compared to male directors, female directors seem to be more active and they are more likely 
to attend board meetings and to sit on monitoring committees (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). 
Women are generally more responsive to crises and more likely to engage in giving than men 
(Williams, 2003). Literature showed that women provide a more collaborative approach to 
leadership, which contributes to greater communication between managers and the board, as 
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well as stakeholders (Eagly et al., 2003). Ntim et al. (2013) and Allini et al. (2016) found that 
the presence of women on the board positively affects risk disclosure. Their results were 
consistent with the research of Ntim et al. (2013). In our paper, we test to see if the presence of 
women on the board leads to better dissemination of the risk information. We, therefore, 
hypothesise that: 
H2.4: The presence of women on the board positively affects the risk disclosure quality. 
 
Based on the agency and stewardship theories, Ho and Wong (2001), Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006) found that when listed firms are mostly owned and 
managed by family members, they are less susceptible to disclose voluntary information. This 
was justified by the behavior of board members who act and make disclosure decisions 
according to the desires and needs of the family. In addition, this negative association can be 
explained by the fact that family members on the board do not have necessary the adequate 
skills, qualification or experience (Sciascia and Mazzola, 2008) which can have a bad impact 
on the quantity or quality of disclosure. Al-Shammari (2014), however, found that the presence 
of family members on the board has not effect on risk disclosure. Based on the agency and 
stewardship theories, we hypothesize that:   
H2.5: The presence of family members on the board negatively affects the risk disclosure 
quality. 
Audit committee characteristics  
 
The third set of hypotheses is related to audit committee characteristics.  We aim to test the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3: The audit committee affects the risk disclosure quality 
 
To test this hypothesis, we have developed sub-hypotheses to examine the impact of different 
audit committee characteristics on the quality of risk disclosure.  
As the board of directors, audit committees that are compound of independent members, of 
management, are best able to perform their independent oversight functions (Klein, 2002). For 
instance, Klein (2002) finds a non-linear negative relation between audit committee 
independence and earnings manipulation.  In addition, Persons (2009) stated that firms which 
make earlier voluntary ethics disclosures were likely to have a larger and more independent 
audit committee. Regarding risk disclosure, Taylor (2011) and Oliveira et al. (2011) found a 
positive effect of audit committee independence on corporate risk disclosure. Their findings are 
consistent with the agency theory. We, therefore, hypothesise that:  
H3.1: Audit committee independence positively affects the risk disclosure quality. 
A number of studies examine the effect of audit committee size on disclosure (e.g. Carcello and 
Neal, 2000; Barako et al., 2006). For instance, Barako et al. (2006) found a positive impact, 
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while Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) and Al-Maghzom et al., (2016) found no impact. In our 
study, we follow Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) who argued that a larger audit committee is more 
likely to improve its status and power within an organization, and enhance the audit quality. In 
addition, it will be more likely to discover potential problems through sharing of knowledge, 
and to improve the quality of internal controls, which will make the audit committee more 
effective in fulfilling its monitoring role (e.g. Barako et al., 2006; Zaman et al., 2011). We, 
therefore, expect a positive impact of audit committee size on risk disclosure. We hypothesise 
that:  
H3.2: Audit committee size positively affects the risk disclosure quality 
 
The type of auditor 
 
Agency theory emphasizes that the external audit has an important role to mitigate conflicts of 
interest between managers and investors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and to guarantee the 
integrity of financial reports (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Besides, Kent and Stewart (2008) 
reported that good governance structure, particularly the type of external auditor, board and 
audit committee diligence, improves the financial reporting disclosure level. In fact, external 
auditors play an essential role in disclosure practices of their clients and may exert them a 
pressure to enhance their transparency (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Besides, when the annual report 
is reviewed by a big 4 audit firm, this leads to better report quality and enhances the investors’ 
perception of the voluntary disclosure credibility on internal control (Deumes and Knechel, 
2008). Moreover, Khlif and Souissi (2010) pointed up that the big audit firms’ role was better 
highlighted after the financial crisis. They found a positive influence of big audit firms on the 
corporate disclosure, arguing that they enhance companies to reveal the appropriate information 
to reflect a good signal to investors. Otherwise, the potential investors may have a wrong signal 
that may be reflected, in turn, negatively to the investment’ decisions.  
 
Risk disclosure literature showed that companies having a Big 4 auditor are more likely to be 
legitimated by the latter to provide better risk information in their annual reports (Hassan, 
2009). In the same sense, Elshandidy et al., (2013) showed that firms with an effective audit 
environs have incentives to reveal more information about their aggregated and voluntary risk 
disclosures. In addition, Abid and Shaiq (2015) showed a positive relation between the amount 
of corporate risk disclosure provided in annual reports of Pakistani listed companies and the 
type of auditor. However, Elshandidy and Neri (2015) did not find a significant impact of the 
type of auditor on risk disclosure. We expect that the type of external audit enhance risk 
disclosure quality. We therefore hypothesize that:  
 
H4: The type of auditor positively affects the risk disclosure quality. 
The corporate risk disclosure and revolution 
Our study examines the risk disclosure in Tunisian annual reports during the period 2008-2013. 
During this period, Tunisia witnessed the revolution of 14 January 2011 that was sparked in 
December 2010. The Arab Spring has undoubtedly affected the business environment. For our 
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study, we assume that the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the level 
and quality of risk disclosure could be influenced by the revolution. In fact, companies are more 
exposed to risk after the Tunisian political crisis and we presume that they are susceptible to 
disclose more risk related information. Such behavior can be explained referring to the signaling 
and legitimacy theories. In fact, companies at the time of political crisis tend to give signals to 
investors about the risks and their ability to manage them, in order to reassure the different 
stakeholders and to legitimate the company’s situation. In addition, we can rely on the 
institutional economic theory to explain the behavior of companies at the time of political 
changes. For that, through prior studies, Makhaiel and Sherer (2018) investigated through an 
interpretive approach the impact of socioeconomic factors on the quality of financial reporting 
in an Egyptian context. They argued that according to the institutional theory a coercive 
pressure leads regulators to enforce rules in order to have better performance and practices of 
companies. Hence, they believed that both economic and institutional regulative pressure might 
affect the quality of financial reporting. 
 
Literature on risk disclosure during crises is limited. Marzouk (2016) examined risk disclosure 
in the Egyptian context during the Arab spring. He found that Egyptian listed companies 
disclose more risk related information during crisis. Gulko et al. (2017) found that, the volume 
of risk disclosure tends to be better during and after the crisis; however risk information is less 
disseminated during relatively stable moments. In addition, they showed that the nature of risk 
disclosure information is more generic, symbolic and historical risk information; nevertheless, 
the quality of risk disclosure tends also to be improved during the financial crisis. Moreover, 
the findings confirmed that company size has an impact on corporate risk disclosure.  
 
Other studies on risk disclosure over the period of before, during and after the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) are scarce (Abraham et al., 2012). Maffei et al. (2014) found that there is no 
improvement in risk disclosure in the period of financial crisis.  Hassan (2014) also argued that 
there is a need for more risk disclosure during the crisis and regulators should set strict rules to 
force companies to disclosure more risk information. Leitner-Hanetseder (2012) found that the 
quality of risk information increased after the financial crisis. Similarly, Probohudono et al. 
(2013) found a little increase in business and credit risks in 2009. Ntim et al. (2013) found no 
impact of financial crisis on risk disclosure. Finally, Meier et al. (1995) also explored the 
disclosure of political risks before and during the Gulf War in corporate annual reports of US 
firms operating in Kuwait. They found that companies disclose insufficient war-related 
information; and highlighted the need of legal requirements to enhance the disclosure of 
political risks. Based on these studies, we hypothesise that:  
 
H5: The revolution moderate the impact of corporate governance on the risk disclosure 
quality.  
4. Methodology 
4.1. Sample and Data collection 
Our sample is drawn from all non-financial listed companies of the Tunisian Stock Exchange 
for the period from 2008 to 2013. The sample covers all industry sectors, except the financial 
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ones. We excluded financial firms because the disclosure by financial institutions may differ 
from disclosure by non-financial companies due to the special nature of their operations, which 
differs from those of the non-financial firms an also have different disclosure requirements 
(Schleicher and Walker, 2010). Moreover, the activities of financial firms can generate different 
types of risk compared to non-financial ones. Risk disclosure literature has also excluded 
financial firms following prior research (e.g. Elshandidy and Neri (2015), and Marzouk (2016)). 
 
We measured the quality of risk disclosure through the company’s annual reports. The 
collection of annual reports was a labour work due to the unavailability of most annual reports 
on websites of companies, BVMT, CMF. Therefore, there were collected directly from the 
CMF, however many annual reports were also unavailable on CMF so there were collected 
directly from the companies. The annual reports were collected following the listed companies 
in 2013. 
It was crucial to check the existence of outliers on the sample. In fact, the outliers for either 
parametric or non-parametric estimations can lead to inflated error rates and substantial 
distortions of parameter and statistic estimates (Zimmerman, 1995, 1998). For that, we carried 
out a test to check whether our estimations can contain outliers, and then we excluded the 
extreme observations for our analysis to avoid biased estimations and to enhance the reliability 
of the results. Excluding extreme observations is consistent with prior literature (e.g., Kothari 
and Zimmerman, 1995). The current study used the student t test for the residuals to identify 
the existence of outliers. We removed any observation that present a t greater than 2 in absolute 
value. 
Table 1 summarizes our firms’ sample for each year, the number of the excluded outliers and 
the final sample for our model. In addition, table 2 displays the sample according to industry 
sectors. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4.2. Measuring the quality of risk disclosure 
The disclosure quality is considered as a latent variable and many researchers tried to define 
and measure it, and it continues to be perceived as an abstract concept, which is difficult to 
measure directly and to have an accurate measure. Beattie et al. (2004, p. 233) affirmed, 
“Researchers investigating the determinants and consequences of disclosure quality could be 
wasting their efforts if the primary variable of interest is not being measured with a sufficient 
degree of accuracy”. 
In addition, Hopkins (1996) defines disclosure quality as the extent to which current and 
potential investors can read and interpret the information easily. Moreover, King (1996) 
perceives disclosure quality as the degree of self-interested bias in the disclosure. It is extremely 
difficult to measure the management’s bias in the information disclosed, as suggested by King’s 
definition. Another definition in this context holds that disclosure quality involves “the firm’s 
ongoing ex-ante commitment to provide disclosure” (Core, 2001, p. 48). The most admitted 
definition is that disclosure quality is considered as a complex, multi-dimensional, context-
sensitive and subjective concept (Beattie et al., 2004). 
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We can affirm that there is no universally accepted measure for disclosure quality and 
particularly risk disclosure and it remains difficult to assess it. In addition, in the Tunisian 
context there is no study to our knowledge that studied a measure for risk disclosure quality. 
However, we can refer to the study of Chakroun and Hussainey (2014) which is considered the 
first study to examine the disclosure quality of financial information in Tunisia. They followed 
the methodology proposed by Braam and Beest (2013) and measured the quality of disclosure 
quality through the fundamental qualitative characteristics (relevance and faithful 
representation) and enhancing qualitative characteristics (understandability, comparability, and 
timeliness). Hence, in our study, we developed a new measure of risk disclosure quality in the 
Tunisian context. For that, we defined risk disclosure quality in terms of decision usefulness 
[13] for stakeholders, and we referred to the conceptual framework of IASB (2010) and notably 
to the Tunisian firms’ accounting system (1997) that presented the qualitative characteristics of 
information. According to Tunisian firms’ accounting system (1997, p. 9) “Qualitative 
characteristics are the attributes that must be for the financial information conveyed in the 
financial statements that are essential for ensuring the production and disclosure of useful 
financial information for decision making”. These attributes are understandability, relevance, 
reliability and comparability. 
Indeed, Botosan (2004) argued that disclosure quality could be measured by quality attributes 
proposed by a regulatory framework. These attributes are understandability, relevance, 
reliability and comparability. Thereby our risk disclosure quality index is presented in table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
We calculated a sub score for each qualitative attribute. Then we measured an aggregate score 
for the disclosure quality. Moreover, we used an un-weighted approach to measure the risk 
disclosure quality for the same reasons advanced in the previous section. In addition to that, the 
sub scores are weighted equally because on the IASB (2006) framework all attributes are valued 
equally. Indeed, Chakroun and Hussainey (2014) on their study of the disclosure quality and its 
determinants in the Tunisian context, they weighted the sub scores of each qualitative attribute 
equally and consider that is not appropriate to prioritize one attribute over the others weighted 
relying on the IASB (2006). Moreover, the Tunisian conceptual framework states that a balance 
must be developed between the different qualitative characteristics. Since the emphasis on a 
quality attribute will generally be done at the expense of another. It recognizes that it is 
commonly admitted that the relevance and the reliability are the fundamental qualities; and the 
comparability and the intelligibility are the secondary ones. However, it points out that it is not 
easy to determine, in a definitive way, the importance to be accorded to each quality attribute. 
In order to ensure the reliability and validity of our scores, we followed Krippendorff (1980) 
and tested the stability, reproducibility and accuracy of the findings of the content analysis. 
Firstly stability also known as intra-rater reliability means that the results should be stable over 
time and this can be verified if the same coder gets the same results by repeating the same work 
more than once. In our study this condition was satisfied by recoding a sample of five annual 
reports later, we do not find significant differences, which confirm the stability of the results 
within the content analysis.  
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In addition, reproducibility is important to confirm the reliability of the classification procedure 
in the sense of being consistent “different people code the same text in the same way” (Weber 
1990, p. 13).  Consequently, two other independent researchers were designed and reviewed 
the content analysis of ten randomly selected annual reports. Each one has read five annual 
reports separately by using the disclosure quality mentioned earlier. Then, the results from the 
two researchers were compared with our results. For our study, we used Scott’s Pi test to test 
the inter-reliability[14]. It was calculated by using online statistical software “ReCal” [15]. For 
five annual reports we found that Scott’s Pi scored 0.878, 0.826, 0.838, 0.931and 1 so a Scott’s 
Pi average of 0.8946. Accordingly, this indicates that the quality scores were sufficiently 
reliable. A result of 0.75 is often considered a satisfactory level of inter-rater reliability (e.g. 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). Given that, our measure of risk disclosure 
quality was considered sufficiently reliable.   
Finally, the “accuracy measures the correspondence of the performance of a method with a 
given or known standard” Krippendorff (1980, p. 72). In our study, the index of the quality of 
risk disclosure was constructed with reference to the Tunisian firms’ accounting system (1997) 
and IASB (2010). 
 
4.3. Research model 
To test our research hypotheses, we use the following regression model:  
Qual = α0 + β1 Conc + β2 Mo + β3Inst+ β4Gov + β5Famo + β6Outsdr + β7Size_bd+ β8 Dual+ β9 
Women+β10Famd+ β11Exaud_q+ β12Size_ac+ β13 Size_comp+ β14 Prof+ β15 Lev + β16 Liquid+ 
β17Divd + β18 Indus+ ε 
Where: 
α = the intercept. 
β1, …,β21= Regression coefficients. 
ε = Error term 
Dependent variables: 
Qual = Quality of risk disclosure 
Independent variables 
Conc: The concentration ownership measured by the proportion of shares owned by major 
shareholders who hold at least 5% of equity ownership 
Mo: The managerial ownership measured by the proportion of managers and executive 
directors 
Inst: The institutional ownership measured by the proportion of shares owned by institutional 
investors 
Gov: The government ownership measured by the proportion of shares owned by government 
agencies 
Famo: The family ownership measured by the proportion of shares owned by family 
shareholders 
Outsdr: The proportion of independent non-executive directors relative to the Board size 
Size_Bd: The number of directors on the board at the end of each year 
Dual: Duality of CEO a dummy variable: « 1 » if there is a duality, « 0 » otherwise 
Women: The proportion of women on the board of directors 
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Famd: The proportion of family members on the board of directors 
Exaud_Q: The type of external auditor, dummy variable 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 
auditing firms and 0 otherwise. 
Size_Ac: The number of committee members 
Ind_Ac: The proportion of independent committee members 
Control variables 
Size_comp: Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year 
Prof: Net profit after tax/Shareholders funds 
Liquid: Currentassets/currentliabilities  
Lev: Total liabilities/ total assets of the firm 
Divid: The ratio of the most recent full-year dividends divided by the current share price 
Indus: 1 if the firm belongs to consumer services, health, industrials and oil and gas, and 0 
otherwise[16]. 
5. Empirical analysis and robustness check 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and its attributes. For the risk 
disclosure quality, it has a mean of 6.89. In addition, we can note that the importance of the 
qualitative attributes are respectively the faithful representation with a mean of 4.73 and a 
maximum value of 11, the understandability with a mean of 1.53 and a maximum value of 6, 
the relevance with a mean of 0.45 and a maximum value of 4 and finally the comparability with 
a mean value of 0.18 and maximum value of 2. This means that the Tunisian companies from 
the period 2008-2013 were more susceptible to disseminate risk disclosure information with 
further explanations than comparable risk information in time and space. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables. The variables 
related to the ownership structure show that the Tunisian listed companies are characterized by 
high concentration ownership with a mean of 68.87%. In addition, the managerial ownership 
varies significantly between companies with a maximum value of 73.5 %, and a minimum value 
of 0%, which leads as to think about a contradicted behavior regarding the quality of risk 
disclosure between the companies characterized by high managerial ownership and those with 
a lower proportion. With regard to the presence of government ownership for some companies 
is considerable (74.42%) compared to others (0%). Moreover, the descriptive analysis shows 
that the majority of listed Tunisian companies are family ones this is concluded through a 
maximum value of 88.81% and a mean of 34.61%. Regarding board characteristics, we found 
that the proportion of independent directors varies highly through companies with a maximum 
value of 75% and a minimum value of 0. Regarding the presence of women on the board is so 
limited. The presence of the members of the same family on the board is high for some 
companies it can reach 71.42% and for a mean of 24.36%.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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Table 6 provides descriptive statistics.  Regarding the duality of CEO we note that the most 
Tunisian listed companies are characterized by a high duality with a percentage of 70% 
companies with a board member holding both the Chairman and CEO roles. Regarding the type 
of the external auditor, we note that most of companies (68.33%) are not audited by a Big 4 
auditor. In addition, the distribution of the sample presents that 48.33% belongs to consumer 
services, health, industrials, oil, and gas. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
We used Spearman correlation matrix because the quantitative variables are not normally 
distributed, except the independence of board’ directors. Table 7 shows that there is no 
multicollinearity problem as no correlation coefficients greater than .80. . We also use VIF 
(Variance Inflation Factor) as another check for the multicollinearity. A VIF value greater than 
10 indicates a case of multicollinearity.  
[Insert Table 7 here]
We used Ramsey test to check for omitted variables. The p value of the Ramsey test is not 
significant 0.3121, which confirm that the model is well specified and we conclude the absence 
of omitted variables. 
 
After that, we examined the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the panel data through a 
specification panel test (the pooling test) (Hsiao, 1986). We performed a chow test following 
Beck (2001) who proposed to use the Chow test to compare the pooled and unpooled 
estimations. We found that the Chow test returns an F (27, 70) = 0.96 and a prob>F = 0.5328. 
Hence, we should not reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity among individuals. This led us 
to conclude the non-existence of individual effects and make the estimation through a pooled 
OLS regression.  
 
Moreover, regarding homoscedasticity, the significant chi2 statistics displayed through the 
Breush-Pagan test, let us reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity for our model. This 
means that the error terms are heteroscedastic. This issue needs to be corrected to have reliable 
results. Therefore, it is essential to correct this problem with the method of White (1980).  
 
We examined the normality of the residuals through the Shapiro Wilk test. It is particularly 
powerful for small samples. The results of the Shapiro Wilk test have p-value greater than 5% 
(Prob>z = 0.74775), which confirm that the residuals are normally distributed.  
To test the autocorrelation between residuals we refer to the Wooldridge (2002) test in panel 
data models. The results (Prob> F= 0.3425) lead us to accept the null hypothesis (no first-order 
autocorrelation). 
 
However, OLS regression has some limitations. One of its main assumptions is the normality 
of the dependent variable. However, the dependent variable is a count variable. Hence, when 
the Y-value is not a continuous variable the OLS regression will not be appropriate and the 
empirical findings will be biased inefficient and inconsistent. Therefore, Poisson regression 
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should be used (Agrawal and Sensarma, 2007). The Poisson regression should be used for rare 
events as opposed to more common events which tend to be normally distributed. For our study 
the risk disclosure quality is a count variable and is not normally distributed. However, the 
Poisson regression is based on the assumption of equidispersion. For that, a deviance test is 
performed to confirm whether we should run the results using a Poisson regression or a negative 
binomial regression. Through the deviance test we confirm the assumption of equidispersion 
(Prob>chi2(96) = 0.3000) which leads us to use the Poisson distribution in our estimations. 
A robustness check was necessary in order to ensure the validity of the findings. Hence, we 
transformed the dependent variable using log. The transformation is helpful to solve some cases 
such as non-linearity between dependent and independent variables, problem of non-normal 
distribution, heteroscedasticity, etc. (Cooke, 1998). The results of regression after 
transformation give us insurance about the validity of the findings of the analysis. 
As shown in table 8 the findings of the Poisson regression are almost the same as those of the 
regression after log transformation. Hence, the similarity of the results allows us to conclude 
about their robustness. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
The corporate risk disclosure and revolution 
We assumed that the revolution has an impact on the association between corporate governance 
mechanisms and the risk disclosure. Hence, we used interaction terms in order to study this 
effect. To respond to this aim we introduce a dichotomous variable related to revolution, which 
takes 0 for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010, and 1 otherwise. Due to the number of variables 
with the interaction terms, it would be better to separately study the effect of the revolution on 
the impact of the capital structure, board characteristics and the audit environment on the quality 
of risk disclosure.  
Hence, we tested empirically the three following models and the empirical findings are reported 
in table 9. We have to note that the deviance test did not support the assumption of 
equidispertion, therefore the negative binomial regression is performed. 
M2:  
Qual=revol+conc+REV_CONC+mo+REV_MO+inst+REV_INST+gov+REV_GOV+famo+ 
REV_FAMO+  size_comp+   prof +lev+ liquid+ divd+ indus 
M3: 
Qual= revol + outsdr +REV_OUTSDR+ size_bd+ REV_SIZEBD +dual +REV_DUAL+ 
women+ REV_WOMEN+ famd+ REV_FAMD +  size_comp+   prof +lev+ liquid+ divd+indus 
M4: 
Qual=revol+ exaud_q+ REV_EXAUD+ size_ac+ REV_SIZEAC+  ind_ac+ REV_INDAC+ 
size_comp+   prof +lev+ liquid+ divd+ indus 





Regarding concentration ownership, the results show a positive and not significant association 
which is contradicted with our assumption and with the agency theory. Literature regarding the 
impact of concentration ownership on CRD is scare, our results are consistent with Konishi and 
Mohobbot (2007), Oliveira et al. (2011) and Elshandidy and Neri (2015) who revealed an 
insignificant association. However, our results are inconsistent with Mokhtar and Mellett 
(2013) who found a negative association. In addition, in term of corporate risk disclosure quality 
our results are inconsistent with Miihkinen (2012) who revealed that a concentrated ownership 
might affect negatively the disclosure of high quality risk information.  
 
A negative significant association at the level of 1% is revealed between managerial ownership 
and risk disclosure quality, which confirms the hypothesis H1.2. This result is consistent with 
the information asymmetry theory, the agency theory, and the entrenchment theory. For that, 
the negative association could be explained according to the agency theory that assumes that 
such situation enhances the alignment of the interests of shareholders and managers (Leung and 
Horwitz, 2004). In fact, managers have an opportunistic behavior and are trying to maximize 
their own wealth. So they will not be motivated to disclose high-quality information because 
they already can have the information directly (Sepasi et al., 2016). Fama and Jensen (1983, 
p.309) state that the “diffusion and separation of decision management and control have benefits 
because they allow valuable knowledge to be used at the points in the decision process where 
it is most relevant and they help control the agency problems of diffuse residual claims”. These 
findings are consistent with Deumes and Knechel (2008) who found that the extent of voluntary 
reporting on risk management and internal control and managerial ownership is negatively 
correlated. Moreover, Marshall and Weetman (2007) and Brown et al. (2011) show that firms 
characterized by high levels of inside ownership are less susceptible to disclose risk 
information. 
 
The findings of the impact of institutional ownership on the risk disclosure quality are consistent 
with the hypothesis H1.3. There are consistent with the signaling theory and agency theory. 
These results can be justified by the particularity of institutional investors and their sensitive 
role to the disclosure of relevant risk disclosure. They are considered the most sensitive 
investors to financial communication. In fact, they are known for their monitoring role that 
enhances financial reporting quality and firm performance (Chung et al., 2002). According to 
the agency theory, the institutional investors could limit the discretion behavior of managers 
and increase risk disclosure (Taylor et al., 2010). Our findings are consistent with Abraham and 
Cox (2007) but inconsistent with Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) who find no relationship 
between institutional ownership and risk disclosure. Moreover, Bushee and Noe (2000) and 
Solomon et al. (2000) have not found a significant relationship between the proportion of long-
term horizon institutional ownership and CRD in annual reports. 
 
The findings regarding H1.4 lead us to reject this hypothesis. In fact, we found a negative but 
no significant relationship between risk disclosure quality and government ownership. The 
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results are not consistent with agency theory and stakeholder theory. From a stakeholder theory 
perspective, state (government) ownership is a key factor influencing corporate governance 
disclosure; particularly in emerging countries where concentrated ownership structures are 
widespread (Cornett et al., 2010; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012). Some prior research found 
that a positive relationship exists between governmental ownership and voluntary disclosure 
(Baek et al., 2009; Makhija and Patton, 2004). However, the result is consistent with prior 
research (Barth et al., 1999; Liu et al., 2014) that found a negative association between 
voluntary disclosure and governmental ownership. Our results are inconsistent with Barakat 
and Hussainey (2013) who found a positive significant correlation with governmental 
ownership for banks.  
 
We assumed earlier that family ownership influence negatively the quality of risk disclosure 
(H1.5). This was justified, referring to agency theory and stewardship theory by the confusion 
of interests between shareholders and managers, hence between development and profit 
maximization. The insignificant results can be explained by the different family attitudes among 
the companies and their position in management. In fact, in companies characterized by an 
ownership family, the mangers are almost those shareholders, which do not motivate them to 
disclose risk related information or to care about the quality of this disclosure. However, in 
companies where the family shareholders do not have an executive position in management, 
their attitude can differ from those who have a management position. Hence H1.5 is rejected 
which is inconsistent with agency theory and stewardship theory. 
The board structure 
The results of the Poisson regression reveal that the independence of the board of directors has 
a positive significant impact on the quality of risk disclosure. Hence, we accept the hypothesis 
H2.1.The results are consistent with the agency theory and dependence resource theory. The 
positive association is justified by the impact of independent directors to reduce agency costs 
between managers and shareholders. In fact, the independent directors are able to make an 
objective opinion on the company’s activities and are looking to fulfill their responsibilities and 
to have a good reputation, which enhances them to disclose more information (Patelli and 
Principe, 2007). Hence, the outside directors tend to disseminate risk disclosure information in 
order to signal their credibility, accountability, and transparency to stakeholders. Therefore, 
more risk disclosure is expected if they are actually carrying out their greater control and 
monitoring of managerial decisions. In addition, the independent directors are more susceptible 
to decrease agency conflicts by monitoring the managers and limiting their opportunistic 
behavior (Fama and Jensen, 1983).This result is consistent with Lajili (2009), Oliveira et al. 
(2013), Elshandidy et al. (2013), Elshandidy and Neri (2015), and inconsistent with Elgammal 
et al. (2018) who did not find a significant association. 
 
The findings show a negative but no significant relationship between the board size and the 
qualityof risk disclosure. This is inconsistent with agency theory and the resource dependency 
theory. Hence, we reject the hypothesis H2.2. The insignificant association can be related to the 
difference among companies regarding the board size, which are a minimum of 4 and a 
maximum of 12. This association is consistent with Elzahar and Hussainey (2012), Allini et al. 
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(2016). However, these findings are inconsistent with those of Al-Shammari (2014), 
Elshandidy and Neri, (2015) who found a positive association and Al-Maghzom et al. (2016) 
who found a negative one and Elgammal et al. (2018) who find a no significant association. 
 
The hypothesis H2.3 is rejected. The findings are inconsistent with the agency and 
entrenchment theory. The results are consistent with Elzahar and Hussainey (2012), Mokhtar 
and Mellett (2013) and Elshandidy and Neri (2015) who found that there is no impact of CEO 
duality on voluntary risk reporting. However, there are inconsistent with the results of Mokhtar 
and Mellett (2013) regarding mandatory risk disclosure (a negative significant association) and 
also Al-Shammari (2014) who found a negative significant association between CEO duality 
and risk disclosure on annual reports of listed non-financial companies. 
 
The results show a positive significant association between the quality of risk disclosure and 
the presence of women on the board at the 1% level. Hence, we accept H2.4. The results 
highlighted the contribution of women on the board to the disclosure of related risk information 
and hence the accountability. Berger et al. (2014), by using a comprehensive dataset of German 
bank directors, has shown that director age, gender, and educational qualifications influence 
organisational risky decision making. Prior literature considers that women on the board of 
directors could enhance the decision making process because there are considered less self-
interested which improve the board effectiveness (Coffey and Wang, 1998). In addition, women 
have the ability to enhance the quality of the board communications and are more likely to 
discuss some issues considered unpalatable by male boards (Clarke, 2005). In fact, they are 
considered more collaborative and provide greater disclosure to the stakeholders (Eagly et al., 
2003) and their presence on the board could be translated to competitive advantage and 
contribute to better corporate governance (Bernardi et al., 2006). There are few studies that 
examined the association between the existence of women on the board and the disclosure. 
However, we can notice that our results are consistent with Allini et al. (2016). Nevertheless, 
Allini et al. (2014) found a negative association. 
 
We found a positive significant association with the quality of risk disclosure and the presence 
of family members on the board. This result allows us to reject H2.5. Notably, there is no 
extensive literature examining the association between this variable and risk disclosure quality. 
However, we can note that our results are inconsistent with Al-Shammari (2014) who did not 
found an association between the CRD and the family members on the board. 
The audit committee structure 
The results report an insignificant association between the size of the audit committee and the 
risk disclosure quality. Accordingly, the hypothesis H3.1 is rejected. Through the literature, 
there is no theoretical explanation of this relationship. Our results are consistent with Elzahar 
and Hussainey (2012), Al-Maghzom et al. (2016). However, there are inconsistent with Barako 




In addition, a positive significant association at the 1% level between the independence of the 
audit committee and the quality of risk disclosure is revealed. Hence, we accept the hypothesis 
H3.2. This association can be justified with regard to agency theory. In fact, the presence of 
independent members on the audit committee will enhance the managers’ control, 
consequently, reduce information asymmetry and enhance the protection of shareholders’ 
interests. Our results are consistent with Taylor (2011), Oliveira et al. (2011) and Elshandidy 
et al. (2013). 
The type of the external auditor 
The coefficients related to the type of external auditor is positively but not significantly 
correlated with the quality of CRD. Hence, we reject the hypothesis H4. According to the 
agency theory, the external auditor plays a crucial role in mitigating conflicts of interest 
between managers and investors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition; he guarantees the 
reliability and credibility of voluntary disclosure (Deumes and Knechel, 2008). Companies with 
Big 4 auditor are more likely to be legitimated by the latter to provide better risk information 
in their annual reports (Hassan, 2009). Our findings are consistent with Elshandidy and Neri 
(2015), nevertheless, there are inconsistent with Elshandidy et al. (2013) and Abid and Shaiq 
(2015). 
 
Regarding the control variables, we found that there is no impact on company size, dividend-
yield and industry type on the quality of risk disclosure. However, a negative significant 
association is revealed for profitability and leverage. In addition, a positive significant 
association is revealed between the liquidity and the risk disclosure quality. Hence, more 
profitable companies disclose less quality of risk-related information. Indeed, if we consider 
the impact of the disclosure of favourable information on competitive risk, the company can 
abstain spreading this information. Moreover, the more the firms are leveraged, the less they 
reveal their proprietary information to avoid bankruptcy. The restriction of the risk information 
dissemination by the manager will let him searching for the ways to manage this risk.  
(Miihkinen, 2012).  
The corporate risk disclosure and revolution 
The results showed that the impact of concentration ownership on the quality of risk disclosure 
decreased after the revolution. It is also the case of government ownership, family ownership, 
size of the audit committee. However, no change in the relationship between the quality of risk 
disclosure and the remainder corporate governance mechanisms. 
The prior risk disclosure studies suffer from research scarcity on an uncertain context, 
particularly in developing countries that have witnessed the Arab spring, where investors 
become more averse to risk (Hemrit, 2018). However, the following results could be explained 
according to agency theory. In fact, when the ownership concentration is beyond certain 
thresholds, large shareholders often tend to expropriate minority shareholders and to create 
private benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In other words, when the capital is distributed 
between some large shareholders, the communication of information is of little importance 
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since the large shareholders have direct access to the information. In fact, the large shareholders 
usually resort to internal information' means in the company, and they are less dependent on 
formal communication' means intended to the other stakeholders. Furthermore, they may tend 
to protect their informative advantage to continue reaping private benefits particularly in the 
moment of crisis. Besides, in such context, the agency conflicts can arise between the 
government shareholders and the managers due to their interest divergence. 
Indeed the aim of the managers differs from that of the governmental shareholders; in the sense 
that the latter is interested in the survival and the interests of the nation more than profit (Mak 
and Li, 2001). Moreover, according to the positive accounting theory, individuals may act to 
enhance their own utility (Watt and Zimmerman, 1978).  
 
7. Conclusion 
We investigated the quality of risk disclosure in an emerging capital market. To do so, it was 
necessary to develop a new measure of risk disclosure quality on the Tunisian context. We used 
manual content analysis. Firstly, the descriptive statistics showed that the quality of risk 
disclosure in Tunisian companies for the period from 2008 to 2013 is weak. Secondly, the 
empirical results regarding the main analysis of the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the quality of risk disclosure in Tunisian annual reports were mixed. We found 
that that the quality of risk disclosure is positively and significantly associated with institutional, 
independence of the directors, the presence of women on the board, the presence of family 
members on the board and the independence of audit committee. However, managerial 
ownership has a negative effect on risk disclosure quality. No impact was found regarding the 
impact of government ownership, family ownership, the board size, the CEO duality, the 
external auditor type and the size of the audit committee. We introduced the revolution as an 
interaction variable in order to assess if it has an impact on the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and risk disclosure.  
 
The main contribution of the study is the investigation on the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms, on the risk disclosure quality using the Tunisian context. In fact, to the best of our 
knowledge, it is the first study that investigated the quality of risk disclosure for all Tunisian 
non-financial listed companies. Moreover, the studies about the quality of disclosure are scare 
and particularly regarding the risk disclosure. In addition, no study to the best of our knowledge 
has studied the quality of risk disclosure in Tunisia. Moreover, the study contributes to the 
literature by developing a new measure of risk disclosure quality adapted to the Tunisian 
context based on the IASB (2010) and the accounting firms’ system (1997). Second, Tunisia is 
an emerging market, and the emerging markets are little studied with regard to risk disclosure. 
Furthermore, the third contribution is the investigation of these practices on a period of crisis 
(political crisis). Moreover, there was a need to better investigate the influence of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the risk disclosure, and we examined the influence of some 
variables that are little bit studied such as the presence of family members on the board of 




The findings of our study have theoretical and practical. On the one hand, theoretically, the 
findings of this research add to the existing literature on risk disclosure, particularly in the 
emerging context. Our measure for the quality of risk disclosure can be replicated in other 
contexts. Secondly, our results highlight the importance of corporate governance mechanisms 
on risk disclosure quality. The study also offers practical implications. In fact, the examination 
of the risk disclosure on the Tunisian listed companies could be helpful to the different 
stakeholders to assess the quality of risk reporting. The findings reveal a very little risk 
disclosure on Tunisian annual reports and a moderate quality of information. Hence, more 
consideration should be taken to impose regulations in term of risk disclosure and the quality 
of such information. In other words, it would be interesting to develop a framework for risk 
reporting practices and guidelines for Tunisian listed companies in order to satisfy the needs of 
the stakeholders and to allow them to make the appropriate assessment of the risk firm profile. 
In addition, the results show that some corporate governance mechanisms could influence the 
quality of risk disclosure. That may motivate the government and policymakers to give more 
importance to the implementation of good corporate governance in order to enhance the risk 
disclosure quality. 
 
The study has a number of limitations.  First, the sample size is relatively small. However, the 
small sample is justified by the fact that few non-financial Tunisian companies are listed and 
we find it difficult to examine other companies due to data availability. Second, we use the 
manual content analysis, which takes considerable time and efforts to score a sample of annual 
reports. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to one year only. Moreover, this study can be 
criticized for using only the annual reports as the only mean of communication. Regarding the 
measure of risk disclosure quality, we tried to develop an index adapted to the Tunisian context 
by referring to the Tunisian firms’ accounting system (1997) and the IASB (2010). However, 
this index is restricted to the four qualitative attributes and it might be interesting to examine 
the tone of risk disclosure. 
 
Our paper offers some lines for future research. It would be interesting to undertake cross-
country studies in order to make a comparison between countries and to enrich the 
understanding of the influence of the different regulatory, cultural and economic environments 
on the risk disclosure practices. For instance, we suggest future research to examine the risk 
disclosure among the other Arab countries especially those that were influenced by the “Arab 
Spring”. Moreover, this study focused on the impact of corporate governance on the quality of 
risk disclosure and ignored the economic consequences. Hence, further research could 
investigate the relevance of the quality of risk disclosure and its impact on the cost of capital, 








2. It is a center within the Arab Institute of Entrepreneurs (IACE), which was established in 
2009. Its mission is to encourage and enable business leaders, administrators and   senior 
executives of the Tunisian public and private companies to add value to their organizations and 
adopt the most advanced practices in corporate governance and strengthening integrity. The 
CTGE work for a growing awareness of the importance of good corporate governance in 
maintaining investor confidence and sustainable performance improvement of the national 
economy” http://www.iace.tn/iace-centres/ctge/. 
3. This definition for risk applies equally well regardless of whether we’re talking about 
investment, market, credit, legal, insurance, or any of the other risk domains (including 
information risk) that are commonly dealt with in business, government, and life. In other 
words, the fundamental nature of risk is universal, regardless of context”, An Introduction to 
Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR), Risk Management Insight LLC, November 2006 
Jack A. Jones, CISSP, CISM, CISA Jones (2006). 
4. The risk that something will go wrong. 
5. The risk associated with uncertainty which gives rise to the opportunity for gain as well as 
loss. 
6. FRS5 “Reporting the Substance of Transactions”, ASB 1994. 
7. CMF is the Financial Market Council (Conseil du Marché Financier). 
8. Law No. 2005-96 of 18 October 2005, s.15. 
9. Article 51 (new), Title II, Chapter II related to the dynamization of the commercial register 
System. 
10. Article 3 (new), Article 3a and Article 3b, Title II, Chapter III of the Law No. 2005-96 of 
18 October 2005. 
11. For example, the CMF issued a release on 8Février 2010 entitled “Reminder to companies 
making public offerings: Activity Report” and recently a release on April 4th2016 “Reminder 
to companies admitted to exchange on the stock market” to remind the newly listed companies 
on the stock exchange of their disclosure obligations. 
12. Code des Sociétés Commerciales (Code of Commercial Companies). 
13. Beest and Braam (2012) defined financial reporting quality in terms of decision usefulness. 
14. The scott’s Pi test was also used by Linsley and Shrives (2006), Abraham and Cox (2007), 
Al-Shammari (2014) to measure inter-rater reliability.  
15. Freelon (2010) and Lombard et al. (2010) state that ReCal software is useful to assess inter-
coder reliability. 
16. We classified companies through their economic growth: high- and low growth firms 
(Hussainey and Walker, 2009).  According to prior studies high growth firms are more 
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motivated to disclose greater information to insiders in order to reduce information asymmetry 
and have more external financing (Khurana et al., 2006; Chavent et al., 2006; O’Sullivan et al., 
2008). Moreover, Elshandidy et al (2013) assumed that firms with high growth are more likely 
to enhance their risk disclosure in order to provide signals to investors about these risks and 
their ability to manage them. For that, we calculated the mean of growth for each sector, and 
the median of growth for all industries. We considered that industries, which have a mean 
growth superior to the median, are high growth industry. For our sample consumer services, 
health, industrials and oil and gas are high growth sectors, however we consider 
telecommunications, consumer goods and basic material are low growth industry. 
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Table 1. Firms’ sample 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Available reports 22 26 30 30 28 27 
Missing reports 10 6 2 2 4 5 
Reports of firms not listed on the 
whole period 
1 0 4 4 2 3 
Total of the analyzed reports from 2008 to 2013= 152 
Initial sample= 148 
(-) Outliers = 33 
Final sample = 115 
 














                                                          
1We have to note that in order to ensure that all the companies were listed on all the period of the analysis 2008-
2013, we removed 4 companies from the 32 companies. Hence, the total number of listed firms are 28 firms. 




Telecommunications 2 6.25 
Consumer services  
-General retailers 4 12.5 
-Travel and leisure 1 3.125 
Health 2 6.25 
Consumer goods  
-Automobiles and parts 5 15.625 
-Food and Beverage 4 12.5 
-Personal and household goods 1 3.125 
Industrials  
-Construction and materials 6 18.75 
-Industrial goods and services 2 6.25 
Basic Material  
-Chemicals 3 9.375 
-Raw materials 1 3.125 
Oil and Gas 1 3.125 




Table 3. Risk disclosure quality index 
Relevance If there are forward-looking 
information 1, otherwise 0 
Faithful representation Explanation 1, otherwise 0 
Understandability Graphs or tables 1,  
No graphs and tables 0 
Comparability In time and Space 1, otherwise 0 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for the disclosure quality and the attributes 
Variable Obs Mean S.D Min Max 
Qual 115 6.8956 4.2722 1      18 
Relev 115 .4521 .8710 0 4 
Faith 115 4.7304 2.7316 1 11 
Under 115 1.5304 1.2726 0 6 
Comp 115 .1826 .4881 0 2 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for independent continuous variables for 2008-2013 
Variable Obs Mean S.D Min Max 
Conc 120 .6887 .1411 .401 .9678 
Mo 120 .1562 .1925 0 .735 
Inst 120 .1554 .1528 0 .5439 
Gov 120 .1232 .2213 0 .7442 
Famo 120 .3461 .3126 0 .8881 
Outsdr 120 .2905 .1913 0 .75 
Size_Bd 120 8.65 2.1872 4 12 
Women 120 .0489 .0880 0 .375 
Famd 120 .2436 .2540 0 .7142 
Size_Ac 120 2.9916 .5575 0 4 
Ind_Ac 120 .0930 .1466 0 .3333 
Size_Comp 120 7.9143 .4668 6.2374 9.2495 
Prof 120 4.6840 7.2922 -19.6154 21.2857 
Lev 120 54.8113 38.7905 5.7466 277.207 
Liquid 120 2.1348 1.5772 .3672 9.3967 






Table 6. Descriptive statistics for dummy variables for 2008-2013 
 Obs. Number  Proportion % 
Dual    
0 120 36 30 
1 84 70 
Exaud_Q    
0 120 83 68.33 
1  37 31.66 
Indus    
0 120 62 51.66 






Table 7. Spearman correlations  
  









































































Conc 1.0000  -0.0913 -0.0514 -0.0758 0.3523* 0.0762 0.0865 0.0117 0..2729* -0.1797* -0.0094 0.2916* 0.2466* 0.2264* -0.3451* -0.1087 
Mo  1.0000  -0.0739 -0.0039 0.0908 -0.1571 -0.2508* 0.2576* 0.1138 0.0265 0.1346 -0.0119 0.0596 0.0420 0.0159 0.1143 
Inst   1.0000  0.1057 -0.3833* 0.0619 0.3385* 0.0276 -0.3343* 0.1991* -0.0737 0.4103* -0.1612 0.2362* -0.1097 0.0269 
Gov    1.0000  -0.4756* 0.3949* 0.3452* 0.4285* -0.3515* 0.1792 0.2065* -0.0871 -0.0887 -0.2002* 0.1532 0.0473 
Famo     1.0000  -0.0864 -0.3433* -0.1742 0.6233* -0..1448 -0.0594 0.2105* 0.1714 0.2553* -0.3714* -0.0335 
Outsdr      1.0000  0.3981* 0.2624* 0..1082 0.1331 0.2680* 0.1348 0.1088 -0.1875* 0.0520 0.0791 
size_bd       1.0000 0.3043* -0.2119* 0.1012 -0.0426 0.2182* 0.0248 -0.0221 0.0381 0.0890 
Women        1.0000  -0.1510 0.1839* -0.0150 0.1593 -0.0590 -0.0066 -0.0765 -0.0761 
Famd         1.0000  -0.1294 0.2671* 0.1362 0.1898* 0.0201 -0.1766 0.0761 
size_ac          1.0000  0.1717 -0.0570 0.0102 0.0540 0.0765 0.0332 
ind_ac           1.0000  -0..1137 0.1613 -0.2761* 0.2794* 0.1672 
size_comp            1.0000  0.0112 0.4722* -0.4887* -0.0056 
Prof             1.0000  -0.4918* 0.4622* 0.5885* 
Lev              1.0000  -0.7489* -0.4291* 
Liquid               1.0000  0.5010* 
Divd                1.0000 
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Table 8. Poisson Regression Results 




Coef. z P> |z| Coef. Robust
d. Err 
t P>|t| 
Conc (-) .1822 0.51 0.613 .0342 .4538 0.08 0.940 
Mo (-) -.9480 -3.05 0.002*** -.9143 .3287 -2.78 0.007*** 
Inst (+) .6349 1.79 0.074* .5701 .4093 1.39 0.167 
Gov (+) -.0582 -0.19 0.847 -.0927 .3581 -0.26 0.796 
Famo (-) -.1830 -0.85 0.398 -.0641 .2485 -0.26 0.797 
Outsdr (+) .8290 3.03 0.002*** .9461 .3382 2.80 0.006*** 
Size_Bd (+) -.0324 -1.53 0.127 -.0256 .0275 -0.93 0.354 
Dual (-) .0641 0.65 0.514 .0692 .1353 0.51 0.610 
Women (+) 2.1466 5.26 0.000*** 2.3848 .5196 4.59 0.000*** 
Famd (-) 1.2736 4.94 0.000*** 1.3834 .3082 4.49 0.000*** 
Exaud_Q (+) .0666 0.63 0.532 .0592 .1305 0.45 0.651 
Size_Ac (+) .0544 0.75 0.452 .0914 .0790 1.16 0.251 
Ind_Ac (+) .7787 2.67 0.008*** .9538 .3742 2.55 0.012** 
Size_Comp  .1527 1.54 0.125 .2651 .1226 2.16 0.033 
Prof  -.0576 -5.18 0.000*** -.0761 .0118 -6.42 0.000*** 
Lev  -.0028 -1.68 0.094* -.0038 .0019 -1.97 0.052* 
Liquid  .0961 2.94 0.003*** .1244 .0356 3.49 0.001*** 
Divd  1.0014 0.55 0.585 2.1299 2.1404 1.00 0.322 
Indus  .0246 0.20 0.845 .0529 .1473 0.36 0.720 
_Cons  .0498 0.06 0.953 -1.0987 1.0583 -1.04 0.302 
 Obs.   115 Obs.                    115 
 Prob> chi2 0.0000                  Prob> F                0.0000 
 Pseudo R2 0.2967                 R-squared             0.7072 




Table 9. The impact of the revolution on the relationship between the quality of CRD and corporate governance 
  M2    M3    M4  
 Coef. Z P> |z|  Coef. Z P> |z|  Coef. Z P> |z| 
Revol 1.2034 2.12 0.034 Revol .3798 0.83 0.404 Revol 1.6818 2.10 0.036 
Conc 1.2308 1.73 0.083 Outsdr 1.1000 2.86 0.004 exaud_q -1.5011 -0.97 0.333 
REV_CONC -.8459 -1.05 0.294 REV_OUTSDR -.3481 -0.73 0.468 REV_EXAUD .2817 1.38 0.166 
Mo -.6839 -1.073 0.083 size_bd .0311 0.88 0.380 size_ac .2701 2.27 0.23 
REV_MO .0013 0.00 0.998 REV_SIZEBD -
0.0300 
-0.66 0.511 REV_SIZEAC -.5516 -2.08 0.038 
Inst 1.11064 2.27 0.023 Dual .2305 1.41 0.157 ind_ac 1.8587 4.27 0.000 
REV_INST -1.1635 -1.67 0.095 REV_DUAL -
0.0229 
-0.12 0.908 REV_INDAC -.0527 -0.09 0.926 
Gov 1.1726 2.86 0.004 Women 1.6174 2.61 0.009 size_comp .1305 1.18 0.238 
REV_GOV -.6944 -1.40 0.161 REV_WOMEN .2766 0.33 0.741 Prof -.0572 -5.91 0.000 
Famo .6822 2.11 0.035 Famd 1.2134 3.79 0.000 Lev -.0027 -1.63. 0.103 
REV_FAMO -.5418 -1.23 0.218 REV_FAMD .1163 0.32 0.752 Liquid .0016 0.05 0.963 
size_comp .1191 0.99 0.323 size_comp .1933 1.88 0.060 Divd 2.7933 1.23 0.219 
Prof -.0598 -4.96 0.000 Prof -.0595 -6.58 0.000 Indus -.2238 -2.35 0.019 
Lev -.0022 -1.07 0.285 Lev -.0016 -1.07 0.283 _cons .253.8 0.27 0.791 
Liquid .1293 3.11 0.002 Liquid .0845 2.41 0.016     
Divd 5.0817 2.05 0.040 Divd 1.7377 0.87 0.385     
Indus -.2478 -1.91 0.056 Indus .1316 1.28 0.201     
_cons -.3961 -0.37 0.711 _cons -.8181 -0.88 0.380     
Obs.  115  Obs.  115  Obs.  115  
Deviance test  0.0959  Deviance test  0.0312  Deviance test  0.0002  
Chi2  0.000  Chi2  0.000  Chi2  0.000  
Pseudo R2  0.0952  Pseudo R2  0.1702  Pseudo R2  0.1265  
M2: Model 2 about the impact of the revolution on the 
relationship between the quality of CRD and corporate 
structure 
 
M3: Model 3 about the impact of the revolution on the 
relationship between the quality of CRD and board 
corporate characteristics 
 
M4: Model 4 about the impact of the revolution on the 
relationship between the quality of CRD and audit 
environment 
 
